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Abstract. Prejudice and stereotypes are two negative phenomena influencing our 
everyday lives. Current theory proposes that they are the effects of death cues acting 
mainly subconsciously, causing a potential for anxiety and provoking to defend 
our beliefs and maintain self-esteem. Although numerous studies have confirmed 
the relation between mortality salience and negative attitudes toward outgroups, 
moderators of this relation drew less attention so far. The following paper proposes 
three factors to consider: need for closure, religiosity and death attitude of an 
individual. Previous research as well as predictions based on the Terror Management 
Theory let us presume that each of them acting differently may play a significant 
role in shaping stereotyped and prejudiced cognition. An in-depth study shall add 
to further exploration of the mechanisms of stereotyping and prejudice toward 
outgroups.
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1. Introduction
“In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes!” – 
the popular quote by Benjamin Franklin expresses the common knowledge 
of every human being. We are well aware of death since our consciousness 
begins and we do not forget about it – no matter how hard we try – till 
the very end. Because survival is a basic human desire, reminding about 
life’s finitude causes potential for overwhelming anxiety. This aversive state 
is managed by people through universal mechanisms but in many different 
and remote ways (Cox and Arndt 2006). One of them observed in a social 
context is a boost in negative attitudes toward outgroups – prejudice and 
stereotyping.
Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski and Solomon 
1986) proposes an explanation of how mortality cues influence attitudes 
toward outgroups. The relations have been tested in the light of TMT and 
found firm and universal although the strength of effects varied between 
individuals (Burke, Martens and Faucher 2010). Therefore, the question 
that requires an answer is how the reaction to mortality reminders is shaped 
according to individual characteristic of a person. This paper is aimed 
to propose an answer, pointing out factors that – among others – are suspected 
to play a role in shaping intergroup cognition: need for closure, religiosity 
and death attitude of an individual. Literature suggests that all three of them 
may be responsible for the level to which prejudice and stereotypes are 
enhanced by mortality, but the last two (framed as below) have not received 
much attention so far and the links between them are rather vague.
2. Dynamics and Effects of Terror
Terror Management Theory comes from an anthropological reflection 
on a dramatic but typical human condition – death awareness. According 
to the theory, this awareness combined with a desire to live forever results 
in a highly aversive state comparable to fear and known as ‘terror’. Not 
to be terrorized in everyday live, human beings developed two buffering 
systems: cultural worldview and self-esteem. The first one equips people 
with a stable and reasonable vision of reality as well as values, by keeping 
which they hope to stay literally or symbolically immortal. The second 
one allows them to rate their worldview highly and think about themselves 
as meeting its standards (Schimel et al. 1999).
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Those systems work mainly beyond our consciousness, protecting us 
from anxiety derived from mortality reminders in daily situations. Whatever 
increases mortality salience – increases death thought accessibility, too. But 
the whole process is quick as thoughts of death are soon suppressed. That 
makes mortality salience a stimulus unique among other threats (Piwowarski, 
Christoper and Walter 2011). Even though we can overlook the mortality 
cues, we often see a reaction which can be varied, depending on situational 
and individual characteristics. To name just a few, people can turn to close 
relations (Mikulincer and Florian 2000), act pro bono (Jonas, Schimel, 
Greenberg and Pyszczynski 2002) or – more in the subject – become hostile 
toward those of a different worldview (Burke et al. 2010), harshly judge 
those who act against their values (Rosenblatt et al. 1989), or undervalue 
others because of their ethnic background (Bassett and Connelly 2011). 
The important part is the mutual goal of these activities: worldview and self-
esteem protection.
Special attention is given to prejudice and stereotypes in response 
to mortality salience. By prejudice we mean a negative affection toward people 
from another group – outgroup members. Stereotype is a generalization about 
those people, a perception aimed at traits that classify them as outgroup 
members and omit individual differences (Fiske 1993; 1998). Undervaluation 
of outgroups occurs often in both reactions, and is thought to be a popular 
mechanism soothing terror. It may work by comparison: negative evaluation 
of an outgroup member results in a better image of one’s own group, raising 
their self-esteem (Burke et al. 2010). Same outgroup members can be seen 
as a threat endangering stability of an individual’s worldview, especially 
when they represent contrary values. Acting against outgroup members 
in such situations is seen as acting in defence of one’s own beliefs (Schimel 
et al. 1999). What is worth noticing, in- and outgroups are not predefined. 
They are determined by perceived differences – mostly in worldviews – 
of a particular person and those around.
Although so far we know enough to link mortality with prejudice and 
stereotypes, the question why people differ so much in using them remains 
(at least partially) unanswered. The meta-analysis of mortality salience 
effects by Burke and colleagues (Burke et al. 2010) points out some 
significant socio-demographic factors: age, gender and nationality. But even 
among people of the same parameters we will observe a variety of attitudes 
toward outgroup members (for instance, recall your classmates in high 
school and their attitudes toward a homosexual person – probably extremely 
diverse). Along those lines, we suggest that the way mortality salience 
results in prejudice and stereotypes may be influenced by three factors. 
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The first one is the person’s tendency to avoid uncertainty: the more one 
feels uncomfortable facing death cues, the more they turn to simple, firm and 
not necessarily fair judgements. Need for closure is a cognitive characteristic 
describing how people deal with uncertainty. Another factor is death attitude, 
because reaction to mortality will depend on whether death is treated by 
a person as more or less threatening. According to the classification of Wong, 
Reker and Gesser (1994), there are several attitudes that people present 
toward death, different in emotional load. The more positive and calmer 
the attitude is, the weaker potential for anxiety is caused by mortality salience. 
The last source of differences discussed in this paper is religiosity – as it is 
a manifestation of worldviews (Dezutter et al. 2009), expressing values 
that one can potentially defend facing outgroups after mortality reminders. 
A person’s view on death is related to religiosity – and so the reaction to death 
reminders should be related, too. Each of the factors is going to be discussed 
in detail below.
3. How do we Process Threats: Need for Closure
Researchers – including TMT opponents, casting doubts on the uniqueness 
of mortality over other threats – put its mechanism and effects into the broad 
category of dealing with uncertainty (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon and 
Maxfield 2006), which is inspiring. It is worth testing, however, whether 
cognitive characteristic involved in dealing with uncertainty – need for 
closure – stands for managing terror as well. Although not novel (e.g. Schimel 
et al. 1999), the role of need for closure in the context of terror has not been 
extensively explored.
Need for closure (NFC, Kruglanski 1989) is a cognitive characteristic 
that reflects an individual’s reaction to uncertainty and ambiguity, defining 
how much one turns to firm, clear answers. The bigger the tendency to avoid 
uncertainty, the stronger the need. Dealing with uncertainty as a core 
motivation in knowledge formation results in people’s behaviour: if they 
perceive the state of not-knowing as aversive, they prefer to decide quickly. 
They do not like to confront their knowledge with other possibilities and 
other people. They seek stability, not novelty. The Need For Closure Scale 
was designed by Webster and Kruglanski (1994) to evaluate the level 
of the need. Added up scores in five dimensions (preference for order, 
preference for predictability, discomfort with ambiguity, closed-mindedness 
and decisiveness) allow to state whether a person avoids uncertainty (high 
on the scale) or not (low on the scale). Because the level of NFC was 
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not changing across time and within various situations, it may be treated 
as a stable trait (Kruglanski 1990; Webster and Kruglanski 1994).
In view of the fact that mortality salience arouses uncertainty that needs 
closure, it is expected to cause different reactions among individuals. Facing 
unknown, i.e. death, will be highly aversive for people who avoid uncertainty 
but will not affect as much those who do not. So the reaction to death cues 
would depend on the level of NFC (Dechesne and Kruglaski 2004).
Besides, there has been a lot of work showing how NFC is connected 
with attitudes toward others, including prejudice and stereotyping. A classic 
study of Dijksterhuis and colleagues (Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, 
Kruglanski and Schaper 1996) was conducted to check the relation between 
NFC and stereotyping hooligans. The researchers found that a high level 
of the need was connected with lower perceived variability of the group, 
so the members seemed to be more similar one to another. Another effect 
was a worse recall of the information inconsistent (vs. consistent) with 
the stereotype of a hooligan – for individuals high on NFC. Such a tendency 
may promote judgements based on schematic information as they are more 
accessible. Roets and Hiel (2011) proved a positive relation between NFC and 
racial prejudice through essentialist thinking. The participants high on NFC, 
who stuck to the information they are sure about, treated outgroup members 
in terms of entitativity characterized by race and therefore presented a more 
racist attitude. Kosic and colleagues (Kosic, Phalet and Mannetti 2012) 
tested the effects of NFC on perception of immigrants. They found that faces 
of immigrants were overclassified to the outgroup considered the biggest 
by those of high NFC level, high prejudice and high perceived threat in the 
context of migration. Individuals high on NFC refer to existing knowledge 
instead of making a cognitive effort – and so they err in classification, 
especially when in threat. Such a tendency in simple processes may come 
out in more complex phenomena, like attitudes toward outgroup members. 
Testing role of NFC in the context of mortality, Schimel and colleagues 
(1999) checked attitude toward a homosexual man consistent with 
the stereotype: artistic, feminine and emotional and a homosexual man 
inconsistent with the stereotype – a ‘masculine’ one. People usually prefer 
stereotype-inconsistent gay men. However, the researchers found that 
after death reminders individuals high on NFC evaluated less positively 
such a man (comparing to control condition, without threat). This effect 
accentuates the tendency of individuals high on NFC to use stereotypes 
as stable and worldview-consistent knowledge structures in mortality 
salience. Threatened, those people turn to existing knowledge, even if new 
information is evaluated higher in general.
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All the reasoning put together suggests that high NFC will affect people’s 
reaction to mortality threat expressed in heightened prejudice and stereotype 
use. It is probably because of the high on NFC individuals’ tendency to avoid 
uncertainty – so to react vividly to death cues, too. Mortality salience is not 
only a fear-provoking state, it also brings along a perspective of new and 
unfamiliar experience of death, aversive especially for those high on NFC. 
Turning to simplified knowledge consistent with their worldview may 
serve their needs and successfully reduce uncertainty. We may expect that 
a regular favour toward well-known and predictable reality of individuals 
high on NFC will be enhanced when facing death cues.
4. Is Death Threatening for Everybody? Death Attitudes
Individuals differ in the ways they perceive death, because the vision 
of symbolic or literal immortality – provided mainly by culture and religion – 
may itself soothe their anxiety when reminded of the final perspective 
(Heflick and Goldenberg 2011). Regardless of the story behind it, death may 
be something that people accept – and as such does not provoke an intense 
aversive state – but it may also be something disturbing and worrisome, 
causing a potential for great anxiety and uncertainty. 
An indirect proof of the relation between death attitude and reaction 
to mortality cues may be found in the study by Wojtkowiak and Rutjens 
(2011). They asked participants to imagine in a very concrete way how 
they would like to be remembered after they die. Doing so, they brought 
up the conception of postself – symbolic immortality of an individual that 
occurred to decrease death thought accessibility and the possible effects 
of terror. Also, afterlife affirmation: reading a ‘scientific’ article elaborating 
about near-death experience as supporting conception of life after death (literal 
immortality) mitigated worldview defence after mortality prime (Heflick and 
Goldenberg 2011). What is important, those results were obtained for both 
believers and atheists. This suggests that faith in any kind of an afterlife 
existence (symbolic or literal immortality) serves as a mechanism buffering 
mortality concerns independently from religiosity.
The view on death and life after death is a part of a stable individual`s 
worldview (Feifel and Strack 2001). One can describe this part in terms 
of death attitudes. Although logically connected, death attitudes, as those 
described by Wong, Reker and Gesser (1994), were hardly noticed as a factor 
in studies of reactions to mortality salience. The researchers distinguished 
five types of death attitudes: approach acceptance (eagerly waiting for life 
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after death), neutral acceptance (accepting death as a natural part of life), 
escape acceptance (waiting for the relief that death offers), fear of death 
(negative affect in response to terror) and death avoidance (active denial 
of death). 
As might be easily noticed, approach acceptance expresses the faith 
in literal immortality – and as such may ease the terror, according 
to elaboration above. It is worth considering that although all death 
attitudes stem from different concepts of life and cause opposing emotions, 
the first three are framed as death acceptance while the other two treat 
death as a dreadful necessity. Because of that, we expect various responses 
to mortality salience – the more an individual turns toward acceptance (vs. 
fear and denial) in overall death attitude, the less aversive arousal is left 
to take over in the final course of effects. 
According to researchers integrating various theories into the Process 
Model of Threat and Defense (Jonas et al. 2012), such a course starts 
with anxiety, heightened vigilance, avoidance motivation and inhibition 
of ongoing activities. That state corresponds to suppression of death thoughts 
to the subconsciousness after mortality salience induction. After a short time, 
approach motivation takes over and one engages in the activities that directly 
reduce the aversive arousal. If an arousal is not noticed or not directly 
manageable – like most of those caused by mortality reminders – one moves 
to other reactions that mute anxiety. The reasons why people turn to a certain 
reaction vary and may depend, for example, on the character of cue 
provoking arousal or values currently affirmed. In general, those reactions 
may be described in two dimensions: concrete-abstract and personal-social. 
Stereotypes and prejudice would belong to the abstract social reactions. 
Hostility and anger that they contain may be seen as an initiating approach – 
motivation that leads to reduction of anxiety. Combined with strong ingroup 
identification, they may be an efficient and simple way to reduce aversive 
arousal derived from mortality salience.
In line with our argumentation, the more composed and accepting 
the death attitude is, the weaker are both negative arousal that mortality 
salience provokes and the following defensive reactions.
5. Against Threat or against Outgroups: Religiosity
Last but not least, it seems reasonable to take into account the impact that 
religiosity has on attitudes toward outgroup members after death priming. 
Religion equips people with visions of literal immortality, reducing 
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the negative influence of mortality salience. It allows believers to accept 
the finitude of life without an intense aversive arousal and therefore reduces 
effects of threat – among them prejudice and stereotyping. On the other 
hand, in the light of TMT, prejudice and stereotypes are worldview defence 
mechanisms. The key question may be whether outgroups represent 
something that one needs to defend their worldview from. Because religiosity 
is a manifestation of a (part of) worldview, by knowing it we can infer how 
threatening the message that certain outgroups carry is, e.g. declaring values 
conflicting with those of our group.
Saying that people favour those similar to themselves seems trivial 
but finds confirmation in numerous studies, e.g. on racial or social status 
preferences. It is worth noticing that the issue of values outweighed other 
similarities and was suspected to play a key role in stereotypes and prejudice 
formation (Chambers, Schlenker and Collison 2012). The researchers found 
people are fond of those having the same political ideology. Similarities 
in liberal vs. conservative worldview were more important than racial 
background when people decided how much they like each other. An influential 
view on the matter of contrary values was presented by Tetlock (1984). 
He proposed the value pluralism model suggesting that variety of political 
sympathies may by termed in preference toward one of two values: equality 
and freedom. Many situations demand from individuals to decide which one 
is more important for them. As people usually rely on a less-effort strategy, 
the more they rate one value over another, the less they struggle making 
choices when values are conflicting. 
The application of the model into attitudes toward outgroups in everyday 
situations can shed a new light on why individuals favour one value over 
another and defend their values in different ways. Christian religion 
provides people with a firm set of values that often overlap with traditional, 
conservative worldviews, tending to affirm equality. On the opposite 
side stands a secular worldview, connected with liberal opinions and 
judgements, affirming freedom. Strong affirmation of their values may lead 
individuals to simplified perception. The more one is unequivocal with their 
ideology, the less complex strategy they use when presented with a conflict 
of values (Tetlock 1984). We assume that when values are conflicted 
in intergroup situation (“my group thinks differently than your group”) 
one may use prejudice and stereotypes as simple and efficient strategies 
to solve the inconsistency they experience. Researchers suggest that indeed, 
intergroup conflicts become highly probable between the religious and 
the secular worldview. It is so partially because there is no match between 
groups in the important purity/sanctity concerns connected with perceived 
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privileged place of human being among other animals and closeness 
to divinity (Kesebir and Pyszczynski 2011). 
Religiosity is understood as a system of beliefs connected with some 
kind of divinity. Starting from Jung’s idea (1965) that religion serves 
as death preparation useful especially for the elderly, through Frankl (1977), 
who treated religion as a way to face finitude of life and to find a meaning 
in it, to TMT that sees religiosity as a part of a worldview: brining sense 
and soothing their fear of death (Dezutter et al. 2009), most of the theories 
accentuated stability and control that religious beliefs provide.
Moreover, Duriez, Fontaine and Hutsebaut (2000) worked on the 
conception of Wulff (1991) that found religiosity not that simple and ‘tool-
ish’. The core of his idea is that there are two independent dimensions 
of religiosity: one focused on believing or not in the existence of God – called 
Inclusion/Exclusion of Transcendence, and another one concerning the way 
religious content is processed by an individual – Literal/Symbolic dimension. 
Two orthogonal dimensions analysed together allowed the researchers 
(Duriez et al. 2000) to turn Post critical belief frame into a scale classifying 
a person under one of four categories: Orthodoxy – for believers who read 
religious message literally as it is; Second Naiveté – for believers who try 
to find their own meaning beneath dogmas; Relativism – for non-believers 
who take something for themselves from religious symbols; or External 
Critique – for non-believers who definitely reject religion with its whole 
heritage. That kind of classification helps to show that people not only differ 
in terms of believing in the Supreme Being as such. They also differ in how 
they process the religious content that affects, i.e. social behaviours (Dezutter 
et al. 2009). 
The impact of religion on the attitudes toward outgroup members is not 
clear at all. For example, Canadian believers evaluated an essay written 
by a Syrian, attacking the Western civilization better than non-believers 
(Norenzayan, Dar-Nimrod, Hansen and Proulx 2009), which implies 
the terror-soothing nature of religiosity. Golec de Zalava and colleagues 
(2012), relying on Allport’s model of religiosity (Allport and Ross 1967), 
demonstrated that intrinsic religiosity described as motivated by one’s 
own internal reasons occurred to predict attenuation of aggressive anti-
terrorism and negative attitudes toward outgroup members after mortality 
prime. It is not true for motivated by social benefits extrinsic religiosity 
that was found to be linked to ethnic prejudice (Allport and Ross 1967). 
We could infer that religious people demonstrate different attitudes toward 
outgroups depending on the intrinsic/extrinsic religious motivation. 
Nevertheless, a review of Batson (Batson, Schoenrade and Ventis 1993) 
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proved the correlation between general religiosity and intolerance in 37 
of 47 analysed studies. 
One way to understand this inconsistency is to look at religiosity 
as a complex phenomenon, as introduced in Post critical belief frame 
which covers more dimensions and thus may explain a more divergent 
influence of it. In the fine series of experiments Shen and colleagues 
(2013) tested the relation between religiosity and attitudes toward different 
groups: atheists, homosexuals, Arabs and Afro-Americans. They found 
that Literal/Symbolic dimension was related to racial prejudice (the more 
literal processing – the more prejudice in a person) but Inclusion/Exclusion 
of Transcendence – to prejudice toward value-violating groups (the more 
inclusive worldview – the more prejudice, again). The first link may work 
due to general attitudes of a person processing literally toward simplification 
and contrasting judgements that comes out as racism, sexism etc. The second 
link roots in key values of a religious person, connected with a divinity they 
worship – that directs them toward defence of such values when facing other, 
conflicting values. Duriez himself stated (2004) that racism is negatively 
linked with symbolical processing, and Inclusion/Exclusion would play 
a role in different kind of reactions, e.g. homophobia, which is related 
to a perceived conflict in values of people from two groups. People who claim 
to believe in God often rate conservative values highly, whilst homosexual 
people tend to prefer a rather secular worldview and values like openness 
and freedom. Moreover, for some believers a matter of sexual orientation 
and related behaviour – in contrast to e.g., nationality – is something they 
perceive as a choice and therefore condemn as immoral.
To conclude, the impact of religiosity on negative attitudes toward 
outgroups after mortality reminders should be explained by anxiety – buffering 
role of religion in one’s view on death. For religious people, death is a gate 
to immortality and as such should not be threatening but rather promising. 
Another thing is that a part of values one declares is based on religion – 
especially Inclusion of (certain) Transcendence. Because of that, others 
who adhere to conflicting values may be treated as potentially endangering 
for believers, causing defensive stereotyping and prejudice. Literal style 
of processing religious content leads to negative attitudes toward people 
of visibly distinctive characteristics, such as skin colour or gender.
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6. Conclusion
Mortality salience – a powerful threat – works mainly beyond our 
consciousness and therefore affects our daily reactions, i.e., attitudes toward 
others, probably more than we acknowledge. Aversive arousal it brings 
is soothed by universal mechanism of anxiety and uncertainty reduction. 
Stereotypes and prejudice often serve as effective ways of it, however 
using them in response to death cues depends on individual characteristics 
of a person. We suggest that need for closure (NFC), death attitude and 
religiosity may be the factors that significantly shape intergroup cognition 
under mortality threat – attenuating or enhancing reaction to anxiety and 
uncertainty. Those three factors were present in previous research but they 
have not been studied extensively in this specific context so far. Unless 
we describe the relation including them all, we will not be able to state, 
i.e. whether need for closure, death attitude and religiosity after death 
reminders buffer anxiety and uncertainty in general or modify the strategy 
to reduce them based on attitudes toward outgroups. It may occur that facing 
terror, people experience an aversive arousal to a different extent, depending 
on the level of need for closure, certain death attitude or religiosity. But 
probably the difference lies also in strategies individuals use when facing 
death – as they may vary according to those three factors, too. Future research 
shall answer those concerns. What seems important, clarifying roles of need 
for closure, death attitude and religiosity in the overall reaction to mortality 
threat, we hope to understand ‘dark side’ of modern, multicultural societies – 
stereotypes and prejudice toward outgroups, and deal with them better.
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